

ER 11-8944

STAT

7 NOV 1959

Handwritten signature
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Johnson:

We have received several inquiries concerning the letter being circulated by Mr. Kenneth Hahn of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles. Inasmuch as you have undoubtedly received inquiries concerning the subject in addition to the letter from Mr. Hahn, I am taking the liberty of writing you about this matter.

Khrushchev's comments about intelligence activities and the Central Intelligence Agency, in our mind, represent part of a deliberate campaign to discredit U. S. intelligence and thus leave a clearer field for Communist subversion. If there is a thaw in the Cold War, Khrushchev obviously would like to deprive the United States of one of its principal weapons for combating Communism. You have noted, of course, that in all of his talk about desiring peace, Khrushchev has stated that Moscow has not renounced and will not change its objective that all of the nations of the free world should and shall become Communist.

As far as Khrushchev's specific claims are concerned, I would point out first that one of his motives was to draw out any information that any official reply or action might supply. You recognize, of course, that from time to time agents are exposed and apprehended. This often happens to Soviet agents. These agents sometimes carry both money and ciphers known as one-time pads. These pads are useful solely for communications between that agent and his home base, and do not affect any other communication system. As far as we are concerned, Khrushchev has not got much comfort out of us in this respect; in fact, nothing comparable to what we have gained from Soviet defectors and agents.

DOCUMENT NO. 37

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED BY 3 204

NEXT REVIEW DATE

AUTH: HR 75-2

DATE: 2 MAR 81

REVIEWER: AP 1092

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Handwritten signature

As far as the general communications systems of the U. S. Government are concerned, they are protected between sender and recipient by a variety of means, none of which were made suspect by Khrushchev's remarks. We are constantly calculating the protection given to such communications by the inherent security of the devices used and are constantly alert to interpret and exploit any information which would alter our calculations. Khrushchev's remarks were limited to matters which did not give us any new information of this sort.

In general, we would say that for the United States to react to Khrushchev's remarks as certain quarters have suggested would be to play into the hands of the Soviets.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

LBK:mfb 5 Nov. 59

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - IG

1 - ER

1 - Legis. Counsel

ILLEGIB

CONCURRENCE:



INSPECTOR GENERAL

DATE

ER 11-8943

card
7 NOV 1959

Senator Richard B. Russell
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Russell:

We have received several inquiries concerning the letter being circulated by Mr. Kenneth Hahn of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles. Inasmuch as you have undoubtedly received inquiries concerning the subject in addition to the letter from Mr. Hahn, I am taking the liberty of writing you about this matter.

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CONCURRENCE:



INSPECTOR GENERAL

DATE

ILLEG

5 NOV 1959

STAT

ER 11-8942

7 NOV 1959

✓
card
Honorable Paul J. Kilday
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Congressman Kilday:

We have received several inquiries concerning the letter being circulated by Mr. Kenneth Hahn of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles. Inasmuch as you have undoubtedly received inquiries concerning the subject in addition to the letter from Mr. Hahn, I am taking the liberty of writing you about this matter.

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Allen W. Dulles
Director

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Handwritten P.S.: I read with interest your comment to the press on this subject. It was excellent. AWD

CONCURRENCE

LBK/dm
INSPECTOR/GENERAL

11/6/59
DATE

STAT

ER 11-8687/a

7 NOV 1959

Honorable Homer E. Capehart
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Capehart:

As you undoubtedly recognize, we have received several inquiries concerning Mr. Hahn's letter.

Khrushchev's comments about intelligence activities and the Central Intelligence Agency, in our mind, represent part of a deliberate campaign to discredit U. S. intelligence and thus leave a clearer field for Communist subversion. If there is a thaw in the Cold War, Khrushchev obviously would like to deprive the United States of one of its principal weapons for combating Communism. You have noted, of course, that in all of his talk about desiring peace, Khrushchev has stated that Moscow has not renounced and will not change its objective that all of the nations of the free world should and shall become Communist.

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Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

LBK:mfb 5 Nov 59

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1 - DDCI


1 - ER

1 - IG

1 - Legis Counsel *W. Hall*

CONCURRENCE:

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

6 NOV 1959
DATE

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SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosure
Exchange of Correspondence,
Senator Wiley - Mr. Hahn

LBK:mfb 5Nov59

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Orig & 1 - Addressee w/enclosure

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CONCURRENCE.



8 NOV 1959

INSPECTOR GENERAL

DATE

*Change to
with original*
ER 11-8760 /a
ER 11-8760 /a

STAT

7 NOV 1959

Honorable Alexander Wiley
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Wiley
Dear Senator Wiley:

This is with reference to your referral of October 29, 1959 of the exchange of correspondence between yourself and Mr. Kenneth Hahn.

Khrushchev's comments about intelligence activities and the Central Intelligence Agency, in our mind, represent part of a deliberate campaign to discredit U. S. intelligence and thus leave a clearer field for Communist subversion. If there is a thaw in the Cold War, Khrushchev obviously would like to deprive the United States of one of its principal weapons for combating Communism. You have noted, of course, that in all of his talk about desiring peace, Khrushchev has stated that Moscow has not renounced and will not change its objective that all of the nations of the free world should and shall become Communist.

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As far as the general communications systems of the U. S. Government are concerned, they are protected between sender and recipient by a variety of means, none of which were made

ER 11-8655/a

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7 NOV 1959

Honorable Stuart Symington
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Stuart:

Khrushchev's comments about intelligence activities and the Central Intelligence Agency, in our mind, represent part of a deliberate campaign to discredit U. S. intelligence and thus leave a clearer field for Communist subversion. If there is a thaw in the Cold War, Khrushchev obviously would like to deprive the United States of one of its principal weapons for combating Communism. You have noted, of course, that in all of his talk about desiring peace, Khrushchev has stated that Moscow has not renounced and will not change its objective that all of the nations of the free world should and shall become Communist.

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SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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LBK:msb 5Nov59

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

6 NOV 1959

DATE